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Abstract
This paper investigates bilateral trade in banking services within the European
Union. The attention has been addressed to two main issues. First, to test the
bank’s motivations for setting up the different forms of overseas offices, and
secondly, to assess the importance of barriers to entry across national European
banking systems. Empirical results confirm the existence of different
motivations for establishing representative offices, branches and subsidiaries in
foreign locations. In addition, evidence has been achieved about the importance
of non-regulatory barriers that could make difficult the existence of a single
European market for banking services.
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1. Introduction
International trade in banking services has received important attention in the literature
during the last decades. The provision of banking services to non-residents can be made on
an arm’s length basis from the bank’s headquarters, or through banking offices located in the
resident’s country. While the first type of foreign banking activity will be determined by the
existence of restrictions to international capital flows, the setting up of banking offices in
foreign countries will mainly depend on the existence of restrictions to foreign direct
investment in the banking sector. The gradual elimination in most countries of barriers to
international capital flows, jointly with a general relaxation of barriers to entry have led to an
important increase in foreign banking activity.
The experience of the European Community constitutes an unique case for the investigation
of international trade in banking services. The Treaty of Rome in 1957 created the basis for
the existence of an European common market. However, in 1983 a White Policy Paper
recognized that at least for financial and banking services, a common market was far to
exist. In fact, as a 1988 study of the Commission of the European Communities showed,
important price differentials for similar banking services across the European countries still
exist. They would suggest the existence of some barriers to entry that would isolate
domestic banking sectors from competition.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the determinants of bilateral trade in banking
services within Europe. Our attention has been addressed to two relevant issues. First, to
test the bank’s motivations for setting up the different forms of overseas offices and
secondly, to assess the existence of barriers to entry within Europe that could partially
isolate national banking systems from competition.
Most papers investigating foreign banking activity have not taken into account the form of
representation chosen by the bank for entering a foreign location. Nevertheless, as Heinkel
and Levi (1992) showed, the form of overseas offices constitutes a relevant issue in the
investigation of international trade in banking services. In fact, representative offices,
branches and subsidiaries represent different levels of investment for the parent bank,
offering a different range of banking services.
Regarding the second issue, the removal of regulatory barriers4
-formally achieved through the II Banking Directive- constitutes a necessary but not
sufficient condition for an integrated European market. In addition, non-regulatory barriers
need to be taken into account.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the recent evolution towards a
single market for banking services in the European Community. The proposed model is
discussed in section 3. Section 4 presents the methodology as well as a description of the
data and variables used in the empirical analysis. Finally, the results obtained from estimating
the model and the conclusions that arise from them are shown in sections 5 and 6
respectively.
2. Toward a single market for banking services
The creation of an European single market for banking services must be viewed as a part of
the wider process of integration of financial services across the European Union, including
insurance and security investment services. It requires the removal of barriers that isolate
domestic firms from competition. Regarding banking services, we should differentiate
between retail and wholesale activities. While wholesale banking services are often supplied
in an international competitive market, retail-banking services have been traditionally
provided on a national basis. Therefore, the major gains from the integration of European
banking systems should arise from the increase of competition in the retail segment. Large
price differentials in retail banking services across Europe should be due to the existence of
barriers to entry. Several studies have attempted to measure the extend of these price
differentials. The most popular is the study by Price-Watherhouse. It estimated the potential
changes in financial product prices as a result of completing the internal market. Two
interesting points emerge from the Price-Waterhouse study: First, benefits from the single
market measured in terms of price reductions are important. Second, these benefits will vary
dramatically from country to country. Accordingly, Spain (34%), Germany (33%) and
France (25%) benefit from the highest reduction in prices. In the opposite extreme, the
Netherlands (10%) obtains the lowest reduction in prices.5
If differences in prices for banking services are due to the existence of barriers that would
isolate domestic banking systems from competition, the elimination of these barriers should
lead to a reduction in price differentials for financial services across Europe. This was the
main aim of the Second Banking Directive approved in 1988. It established the principle of
mutual recognition, and the existence of a single license for operating across the European
Community. Therefore, a bank authorized to operate in a member country could operate in
any other member country without the need of local authorization. It was expected that once
regulatory barriers to foreign banks were removed, a substantial cross-border banking
movement within Europe would occur. Nevertheless, ten years after the approval of the II
Banking Directive the level of integration of the European banking system does not seem to
have changed much. According to White (1998), in 1998 cross-border offices within Europe
represent less than 0,3% of the total banking offices. This fact would indicate that cross-
border banking movement had not occurred yet. Some factors have been suggested as
responsible of this situation. First, as traditional barriers to entry have been removed, the
attention must be addressed to other kind of barriers, such as technical standards and
cultural differences between consumers across Europe. These barriers may have the effect of
isolating domestic banking systems from competition, making difficult the existence of a
single European market for banking services.
3. Model
The purpose of this section is to specify a model of cross-border banking movements across
Europe. Unlike most previous researchers, in this paper international expansion through
representative offices, branches and subsidiaries is investigated. The proposed model is
based on the activities typically carried out by overseas banking offices. In addition, the
existence of barriers between national banking systems has been considered. The bank’s
motivations for entering a foreign market have been traditionally classified in four main
areas: 1) servicing exporters from the home country, 2) servicing foreign subsidiaries of
home country clients, 3) participating in the host country’s capital markets, and 4)
participating in the host country’s banking system. Heinkel and Levi (1992) did not consider6
the last as an activity carried out by overseas offices. The reason is that participating in the
host country banking system is normally carried out by foreign subsidiaries, that enjoy the
legal status of national banks
1. Nevertheless, the fact is that subsidiaries, as representative
offices and branches, belong to a parent bank, and constitute an organizational form for
carrying out a foreign activity. In addition, as Ter Wengel (1995) notes, banks may consider
branches subsidiaries and representative offices as substitute organizational forms in their
foreign expansion.
Previous research has emphasized the importance of barriers to entry as a main determinant
of cross border banking movements. Regulatory restrictions in the host country have been
often mentioned as a barrier to entry in multinational banking. A pre-requisite for entering a
foreign country is obviously, that the entry is allowed by the national authority. With few
exceptions, researchers do not make any difference regarding the form of representation
chosen by the bank for entering a foreign location. As it has been previously noted,
regulatory barriers were formally removed within the European Union through the Second
Banking Directive. Nevertheless, factors as the existence of hidden restrictions, as well as
non-regulatory barriers could -at least partially- isolate national banking sectors from
competition.
The discussion about the determinants of cross border banking movements within Europe is
presented next.
3.1. Servicing home country clients
A main motive for establishing banking offices abroad has been to provide banking services
to home country clients. The range of banking services typically offered would include the
provision of information about the general and economic conditions for doing business in a
particular foreign country and, above all, the collection of receivables for home country
exporters. The rationale of this behavior would be the need to preserve existing banking
relationships in the home country before they could be eventually substituted by a new
banking relationship (Williams, 1997). Empirical evidence widely supports servicing home
                                                       
1 Therefore, from a legal viewpoint they are not overseas offices.7
country exporters as a determinant of foreign banking expansion (see Heinkel and Levi,
1992, Ter Wengel 1995 and Brealey and Kaplanis, 1996).
3.2. Following-the-client-behavior
Banks following their clients’ multinational expansion has been widely considered as a main
motivation of cross-border banking movements (see e.g. Grubel, 1977 and Gray and Gray,
1981). Information asymmetries regarding local banks about the client’s financial needs
would constitute a main ownership advantage for the foreign bank. Empirical research
supports, for the most part, a following-the-client behavior in the banking sector (Grosse
and Goldberg, 1991 and Ter Wengel, 1995). However, a general agreement does not exist
about the organizational form used by the bank for servicing clients in foreign locations.
3.3. Participating in the host country’s capital market
Banks have traditionally played a major role in domestic and international capital markets.
The growing expansion of commercial banks towards the securities business
2 should make
this trend to continue and even increase in the future.
 Accordingly, some authors have suggested that banks will establish facilities abroad with
the aim of participating in the host country’s capital market. Hence, through overseas offices
banks would funnel internationally the savings originated in the home country. The greater
possibilities of diversification available at an international level would justify this behavior.
Previous research has revealed the existence of large and well-developed capital market in
the home country, as a determinant of banking expansion abroad (see Heinkel and Levi,
1992).
3.4. Participating in the host country’s banking system
Participating in the host country banking system should be a quite straightforward
motivation for establishing overseas offices. Accordingly, banks would enter in foreign
countries to carry out the typical commercial banking activity of lending and accepting
deposits. Since the interest margin –the difference between interest earned and paid-
constitutes the main component of banking benefits, high interest margins –adjusted for the
                                                       
2 This behavior is usually justified due to information advantages and economies of scope (Diamond,1984 and 1991).8
Nevertheless, monopoly rents that persist with time are only possible under the existence of
effects arise: the existence of monopoly rents will make a foreign location more attractive to
the entry less likely to occur. The net result, of course, will depend on which effect prevail.
3.5. Host country’s attitude towards foreign entry
Goldberg and Johnson, 1990). In fact, a license from the national authority is needed in most
countries to operate in the market. The Second Banking Directive established the single
operate in a member country could operate in any other member country without the need of
local authorization. However, although national European governments can not formally
entry involves the acquisition of a national bank. The recent attempt by Nationale
Netherlanden to acquire Bank Brussels Lambert constitutes a good example of this situation.
3.6. Cultural distance
Differences between consumers across Europe are expected to constitute an entry barrier in
 highly
standardized products, the bank’s ability to connect with its potential client needs will be
lower when important cultural differences exist. This would explain what casual observation
shows: the firsts movements abroad tend to occur towards nearby countries, that typically
share cultural similarities with the home country. Empirical evidence for the US supports
cultural distance as a barrier of entry in international banking (Grosse and Goldberg, 1991).
Therefore, we expect that a higher cultural distance between two countries will make
bilateral banking movements less likely to occur.9
4. Data and variables
In this paper, the proposed model has been estimated using Poisson regression. Previous
researchers investigating foreign banking activity have mainly used ordinary least squares
(e.g. Heinkel and Levi, 1992 and Grosse and Goldberg, 1991) and logistic regression (Ter
Wengel, 1995). An exam of our matrices of data shows some limitations associated to both
approaches. First, ordinary least squares do not allow to capture the discrete nature of the
dependent variable: the number of banks proceeding from country i with offices in country j.
On the other hand, logistic regression only allows two values for the dependent variable: 0
for all cases where no bank from country i has entered country j and 1 otherwise. Therefore,
since it does not take into account the number of banks from country i that have entered
country j, it will not measure properly international trade in banking services. On the
contrary, Poisson regression models allow to capture the discrete and nonnegative nature of
the data, taking into account the number of banks from a home country with offices in a
foreign location
3 Regarding the form of representation used for entering a foreign market -
representative offices, branches and subsidiaries- three models have been estimated. The
dependent variable -ROij in the model of representative offices, BRij in the model of
branches and SUBij in the model of subsidiaries-, measures the number of banks proceeding
from country i with representative offices, branches and subsidiaries respectively in country
j.
According to the discussion in section 3, the independent variables are the following:
EXPij: the level of exports in millions of US $ from country i to country j. Source:
International Monetary Fund, (1994). Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook.
MNCij: The number of multinationals based on country i with full-owned subsidiaries
in country j. Source: John M. Stopford, (1992). Directory of Multinationals.
                                                       
3. See Greene, 1993, Ross, 1982 and Winkelmann and Zimmerman, 1995, for a detailed discussion about the properties
of Poisson regression models.10
CAPi: The capitalization of country i in millions of US $. Source: Federation
International des Bourses de Valeurs, (1994). Memoire Annuel
IMj: Interest margins as a percentage of total assets in country j. Source: OECD,
(1994). Bank Profitability.
Rj: An indicator of the attitude by authorities in country j about the entry of foreign
banks
4. Source: Thschoegl (1981). The regulation of foreign banks: Policy
formation in countries outside the United States.
CDij: Cultural distance between countries i and j. Source Hoefstede (1983). The
cultural relativity of organizational
practices and theories.




The sign above each independent variable in the former expressions indicates the expected
effect according to the discussion in section 3.
The sample used for estimating the models is formed by the banks included in the top 300 by
the Banker in 1994, belonging to any of the EUR-15 countries excluding Luxembourg. The
exclusion of Luxembourg has been due to the non-availability of data corresponding to this
                                                       
4 This indicator takes entire values from 1 to 5, according to the restrictiveness of host country’s attitude towards
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country for some variables. Therefore, we have investigated bilateral cross-border banking
movements
between Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.
Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics about the variables.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Stand. Dev. Minimum Maximum
EXP 4894.90 7873.00 32.00 0.43E+05
MNC 11.57 18.38 0.00 82.00
CAP 0.20E+06  0.30E+06 605.00 0.11E+07
IM 2.65 1.09 1.34 4.97
R 3.93 1.39 1.00 5.00
CD 4.81 2.30 0.50 10.40
4. Results
Empirical results presented in table 2 show the significance of the proposed model for the
three forms of overseas offices: representative offices, branches and subsidiaries.
Nevertheless, as it will be discussed next, some interesting differences regarding the form of
representation have emerged.
According to the motivation for entering a foreign market, the level of exports from the
home country positively affects, as expected, the bank’s entry in a foreign location. Variable12
EXP shows a positive associated coefficient, statistically significant at a 0.01 level in the
three models, showing that banking services to home country clients are provided through
representative offices, branches and subsidiaries. Evidence has been achieved supporting a
following-the-client behavior in the banking sector. As expected, the presence in a foreign
location of multinationals from the bank’s country of origin positively affects the setting up
of representative offices, branches and subsidiaries. As in the previous case, the associated
coefficient to MNC has a positive sign being statistically significant at a 0.01 level in the
three models.
Participating in the host country’s capital market positively affects cross-border banking
movements through representative offices and branches but not through subsidiaries. In the
first two cases, variable CAP shows a positive associated coefficient, significant at a 0.01
level. On the contrary, in the model of subsidiaries it has a negative sign although it is not
statistically significant. This result would suggest that banks tend to participate in the host
country’s capital market through representative offices and branches but not through
subsidiaries.
High interest margins in the host country positively affect foreign banking entry through
representative offices and branches, while surprisingly it does not affect the setting up of
subsidiaries. The associated coefficient to IM is positive and statistically significant at a 0.01
level for representative offices and branches, meanwhile it is negative although non-
significant in the model of subsidiaries. According to the definition of interest margins, a
positive sign would indicate that high interest margins in a foreign location would make this
location more interesting for the bank, favoring the entry. Due to its legal status, the
subsidiary seems to be the suitable form of representation for participating in the host
country’s banking system. Hence, a positive coefficient was expected. However, as it has
been previously noted, high interest margins are usually associated to barriers to entry,
especially important in the retail banking segment. Therefore, the existence of entry barriers
could neutralize the attractiveness of the foreign location due to high interest margins.
Representatives and branches, on the other hand, focus their activity on the wholesale
banking segment, where barriers to entry are lower.
Table 2. Results13
Variable  Representative    Branches Subsidiaries



























Constant -1.19 -1.51 0.13
N 182 182 182
Log-likelihood -255.28 -229.32 -143.11
T values in parentheses.
a-Significant at a 0.01 level.
b-Significant at a 0.05 level.
c-Significant at a 0.1 level.
The attitude of host country authorities towards foreign entrants does not affect cross-
border banking movements through representative offices and branches. In both cases,
variable R shows a positive coefficient which is not statistically significant. In the model of
subsidiaries, the associated coefficient is negative and significant, but only at a 0.1 level. This
result suggests that a restrictive attitude by host country authorities toward foreign entrants
does not affect the setting up of representative offices and branches, but paradoxically favors
the entry through subsidiaries. A quite straightforward explanation would be that while no
barriers seem to exist for representative offices and branches -probably because they tend to
operate in the wholesale segment-, banks tend to establish subsidiaries in locations with
restrictive policies about foreign entrants, where higher monopoly rents should exist.14
Finally, cultural differences between clients across Europe negatively affect cross-border
banking movements through representative offices, branches and subsidiaries. The
coefficient associated to CD is negative in the three models. Its significance level is 0.01 in
the models of branches and subsidiaries, and 0.05 in the model of representative offices.
Therefore, as it had been hypothesized, cultural distance constitutes an important non-
regulatory barrier in cross-border banking within Europe.
5. Conclusions
This paper has investigated cross-border banking movements within Europe. The attention
has been addressed to two set of issues. To test the bank’s motivations for establishing
different forms of overseas offices and, to assess the existence of barriers to entry in the
European national banking systems.
Our results show that important differences exist between the setting up of representative
offices and branches, regarding foreign subsidiaries. Therefore, while representative offices
and branches may be considered, to a certain extent, substitute forms of representation for
the parent bank, subsidiaries play a different role. Unlike the other forms of representation,
subsidiaries do not seem to take an active role in the host country’s capital market. In
addition, banks tend to establish subsidiaries in locations with a more restrictive attitude
towards foreign entrants, possibly due to the existence of monopoly rents in the retail
segment. This result supports the assumption by Heinkel and Levi (1992), that subsidiaries
compete less directly with other forms of representation, than other forms of representation
compete between them.
The results also reveal the importance of non-regulatory barriers, such as cultural distance
between consumers within Europe, in the integration of national banking systems. This
result is especially important, showing that although regulatory barriers were completely
removed, cultural differences could make difficult the existence of a single European market
for banking services. In this point, we must mention the effect that the introduction of the
Euro should have in the integration of the European banking systems. As some authors have
noted, separate currencies divide the market in money even more than those in other goods15
and services. In this context, the Euro should contribute to the integration of national
banking systems by reducing the importance of national differences.16
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